Category Archives: The Balkans
Croatia A Victim? Not in This Century
Yesterday, the Washington Times (yes, the Moonie cult founded newspaper) ran an absurd editorial by Jeffrey T. Kuhner defending Croatian military leader Ante Gotovina, and decrying the ICTY for its prosecution of him. Kuhner seems to be of the belief that Croatia was a victim of Serb nationalism, that Slobodan Milosevic would have destroyed said country if left unchecked, and that the only individuals who deserve punishment for the events of the Wars of Yugoslav Secession are Serbs. His view doesn’t much differ from that of the average American, who being fed a steady 90′s diet of CNN and the New York Times, sees the Serbs as the bloodthirsty butchers of Europe, heir to the legacy of brutality once associated with Adolph Hitler. But, such a belief has little basis in the facts.
To properly understand the events of the Wars of Yugoslav Secession, we must understand Yugoslav history, which begins with the defeat of the Central Powers during WWI. In the post-war settlement, the Western allies sought to create a number of independent states in East-Central Europe that would be powerful enough to prevent the resurgence of Germany and Austria, and counterbalance the dominance of the USSR, while still weak and conflict-ridden enough that international intervention by way of the League of Nations would be necessary. To that end, the nations created were not borne out of plebiscites, despite the grandiose rhetoric championing self-determination and democratic governance. Rather, states were shaped to ensure conflict.
Europe in 1922 - Click to Enlarge
As the enlarged version of the above map should make clear, the borders drawn were bound to cause problems. For example, Danzig was left to the Germans, but was geographically isolated from the rest of said country, as all the intermediate territory was awarded to Poland. Similarly, a large portion of Silesia was awarded to the Czechs, much to the dismay of both the Germans and the Poles. Perhaps most famously, the Sudatenland went to Czechoslovakia, which was appropriate, since Germans made up less than 25% of the population, but which all the same enraged Germany. Territorial disputes aside, the new map of Europe broke up empires, and restored historic states such as Poland, which had died out in 1795 when Russia, Austria, and Germany (then still known as Prussia) partitioned it.
Yugoslavia however, was unique. Never before had a Yugoslav state existed. As I’ve written about before, there is a well-established history of a Serb state, which included Kosovo, Montengro, Bosnia, and much of Macedonia. It even included portions of Croatia. However, the historic record is not replete with evidence of Serb rule over the collective Croat community, whose independence before World War II is a contested historical matter. And it certainly never included Slovenia. As historian Joseph Rothschild notes quite clearly in East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, the Serbs wanted their monarchy to cover historic territory, and had no interest in being co-nationals with the Croats and Slovenes. Likewise, because the monarchy of Yugoslavia would be Serbian, neither the Croats or the Slovenes cared for such an arrangement. Lacking any sense of national unity, the country quickly fell apart when faced with a second world war.
For its part, following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Croats jumped at the prospect of an alliance with Hitler, whilst their Serb brethren mounted two major resistance movements (the Partisans and the Chetniks). As soon as the invasion was complete, they installed Ante Pavelic, who had been under the protection of Mussolini following the French indictment against him for the double assassination of Yugoslavian King Alexander I and French foreign minister Louis Barthou, as dictator. As Avro Manhattan noted in his groundbreaking word The Vatican’s Holocaust:
The Nazis had records of massacres of their own second to none. Yet the horrors committed by Pavelic’s Ustashi troops proved to be of such bestiality as to shock even them: a most crushing evidence that the Ustashi massacres had surpassed anything experienced even by the Germany of Hitler. The magnitude of the butchery can best be gauged by the fact that within the first three months, from April to June, 1941, 120,000 people perished thus. Proportionately to its duration and the smallness of the territory, it had been the greatest massacre to take place anywhere in the West prior to, during, or after that greatest of cataclysms, the Second World War.
Pg 54 (1986, Ozark Books)
As the previously linked Jerusalem Post article makes clear, this brutality was not the mere result of cold, machine-like efficiency, but driven by demented competition:
On August 29, 1942, a friar from the monastery of Siroki Brijeg, named Petar Brzica, won first place for killing the most Serbs in the shortest time, boasting 1,350 throats slit in one night.
The Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) have almost as revolting a track record, but I shall avoid extensive discussion of the matter, as it is somewhat tangential to the subject at hand. What I hope the above illustrates is that the first Yugoslav confederation, known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was doomed to fail, because it grouped enemy peoples under one government, who were happy to fracture as soon as the opportunity presented itself, with catastrophic results thereafter.
After World War II, the Western allies once again re-built Yugoslavia, this time replacing a Serb-led monarchy with a Communist dictatorship. Leading this unfortunate entity was Josip Broz Tito, a Croat by birth who led the Yugoslav Partisans (which was, in the early days, was largely comprised of Serbs from Montengro and Bosnia). It was his wartime actions which left him in power for decades thereafter. But, it is vital to note, that the only reason the Partisans became the dominant force is because Churchill betrayed the Chetniks, seemingly due to faulty intelligence passed on by highly-placed Soviet moles. A regime under his command was commensurate with the Yalta “percentages agreement” reached between Churchill and Stalin to divide influence in the new Yugoslav state evenly, as Tito was a communist, but not loyal to Stalin.
Of course, World War II hadn’t changed anything, except that now the hostility between Serbs and Croats was greater than ever, and the government had replaced monarchy with communism. With the death of Yugoslavia’s master manipulator, who routinely re-wrote the national constitution and shifted the internal borders to dilute the influence of Serbs displeased with his leadership (and in so doing empowering many of the groups who would agitate for war soon thereafter) it was all but assured that the state would fail not long after his death.
It is here where we can begin to discuss Milosevic, and the allegations of Serb brutality during the Wars of Yugoslav Secession. Kuhner echoes the dominant Silber and Little thesis, made famous in the undeservedly popular Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, which portrays the collapse as a necessary and blameless reaction by non-Serbs to extreme Serb nationalism as anchored by Slobodan Milosevic. To dispel such nonsense, we must look at Milosevic’s rhetoric, rise to power, and actions once in power.
Milosevic first became a recognizable figure within the Serb community on April 24, 1987, when he spoke before a crowd of 15,000 Serbs in Kosovo Polje. Tensions were high, as the continued influx of Albanian immigrants under Titoist policy had given the group a super-majority, which threatened the political and safety rights of the ever-dwindling Serbian minority population, already subject to mass violence. Accordingly, the Serbs in Kosovo clamored for intervention by the Federal government on their behalf, which had not yet happened. As an empty gesture designed more to pacify the crowd of angry Serbs than to facilitate a redress of grievances or study the situation to determine an appropriate course of action, Milosevic had been “dispatched from Belgrade (as documented by Louis Sell in “Slobodan Milosevic: A Political Biography,” which ran in Problems of Post-Communism 46.6 Nov/Dec 1999).” This is particularly important to understand as it makes clear Milosevic went to Polje not with an agenda that would end with his seizure of power, but because his superiors ordered he go there and give a party-approved speech devoid of any proposals for a change in policy that would give Serbs equal protection in Kosovo. In other words, he was sent in as a pawn with no nationalist aims.
His statements acknowledged the importance of Kosovo, though not in radically nationalist terms. Speaking of the situation, Milosevic described it as “the weightiest problem during a difficult economic crisis, when standards have fallen drastically, when prices have climbed, when there are more unemployed,” thereby attempting to frame his case in the prism of communism that so defined his policy. In the speech, he specifically cautioned against degenerating into nationalist conflict, saying “I believe that those who carry the spirit of brotherhood and unity, equal rights and progressiveness can be and must be the only working class of Kosovo, because those that are unified have identical interests, and the least reason to divide into nationalism.” Only through willful misinterpretation of his words can sentiments of Serb nationalism be found in his words. Lines such as “It was never in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin nation to bow before adversity, to demobilize when they need to fight, to demoralize when times are tough. You need to stay here because of your forefathers and because of your descendants. You would shame your forefathers and disappoint your descendants,” must be understood in context. He was not concerned so much with asserting Serb control over Kosovo as he was interested in ensuring that Serbs and Montenegrins not be “pressured by crime and humiliation” to give up their land, and that Kosovo have a sufficient ethnic balance that the Albanians could not achieve their secessionist aims. This is particularly well evidenced by his concluding statement that “Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia will never give up Kosovo!” The mention of Serbia is expected because Kosovo, though largely autonomous, was (and technically speaking still is) a province of Serbia. But that is of relatively little consequence, for he focuses chiefly on Yugoslav unity, speaking to the need for action in Kosovo based on its integral role in preserving Yugoslavia.
Many cite his 1989 speech marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo as evidence of his nationalist vision for Serbia. Indeed, his rhetoric was more firebrand than before, and one so motivated could pick out individual statements that seem somewhat damning. Yet the overall tone is again moderate. “Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it,” he said. And even when speaking of Serbia itself, Milosevic noted that “Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage.”
Certainly, this does not sound like the rhetoric of an ardent Serb nationalist. Compare these statements against the words of his Bosniak and Croat counterparts, and it becomes apparent just how moderate Milosevic’s words were. Of course, politicians throughout history have said one thing and done another. So, we must ask, is Kuhner’s claim reasonable? Did Milosevic really aim to “unite the truncated parts of Croatia with the nearly 70 percent of territory his forces had carved out in neighboring Bosnia,” and in so doing, engage in “state-building through genocidal partition?”
Useful in understanding the Croatia situation is the story of Slovene independence, as it fought for independence at the same time Croatia did. The wealthiest of the Yugoslav states, Slovenia was often the odd republic out, having few bonds with the other peoples of Yugoslavia, except for the Yugoslav national identity pushed by the state. Thus, on December 23, 1990, Slovenia held a referendum for independence, with only 5% voting to remain a part of Yugoslavia. In one of the least bloody conflicts in regional history, Slovenia won independence in the Ten Day War, which claimed a mere 62 lives. Neither Milosevic nor the Serbian military leadership supported the Federal plan for a full scale invasion, defending Slovenia’s exit from Yugoslavia. It was not that he saw the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a positive, but that their independence was not a profound threat to the Serbs. Slovenia was (and remains) the most ethnically homogeneous former Yugoslav republic. It had very few Serbs, and would not present major territorial dispute issues for Yugoslavia moving forward.
Croatian independence was an entirely different matter. Before Operation Storm, which ethnically cleansed the region, Krajina had an estimated 430,000 Serbs. Moreover, an independent Croatia would fight with the slowly collapsing Yugoslav state for control of Bosnia, which contained more than 1.3 million Serbs. No neat borders could be drawn, and neither territory was prepared to allow their Serb minority to remain with Yugoslavia. Given the all too recent history of World War II, the Serb minorities in each had profound reason to fear for their safety. This is made especially true by the fact that both the Bosniaks and the Croats quickly returned to their Nazi-era habits. As Djilas notes in the linked Croatian article, almost immediately after the democratic election of Croat leader Franjo Tudjman (an infamous Holocaust denier), the government restored to prominence of the pro-Nazi Ustashe regime and adopted its flag, currency, and anthem. Further, under his direction, Croatia dropped the official use of the Cyrillic script favored by the Serbs, fired many government-employed Serbs, and significantly reduced Serbian parliamentary representation.
Yet, as willing as the Croats were to threaten the Serbs, Milosevic provided little support to his ethnic kin in the rebel republics. The greatest evidence of this is in his handling of Bosnia, where Bosnian Serbs were at war with Croats and Bosniaks for control of their shared homeland. Following the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan, which would have involved the surrender of substantial territory to Herzog-Bosnia (Croatian Bosnia), Milosevic imposed a blockade on the Drina in 1993, cutting off the availability of weapons and other critical resources to the VRS (Bosnian Serb Army). It is worth noting here that NATO did not first bomb Serb territory until 1995, so there was no military pressure for Milosevic to betray his own. As to the Krajina Serbs in particular, Srdja Trifkovic notes in The Krajina Chronicle: A History of Serbs in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, “In Serbia however, [the Republic of Serbian Krajina] was seen as an unwanted economic and burden by Milosevic. To his frustration, the Krajina Serb assembly continued to reject his demands to settle the conflict by accepting the principle of Croatian sovereignty (pgs 217-18).”
Categorically therefore, we can conclude that Milosevic was not a hardliner bent on creating a Greater Serbia. Both his actions and his rhetoric evidence as much. On those grounds alone, one should be prepared to disregard the Kuhner article. If not, his outright hypocrisy should do the trick. Whereas he trivially asserts that Operation Storm, which essentially led to an exodus of all Krajina Serbs not killed in the initial attack, as a proper rebuff against the Serbs, he laments supposedly similar actions taken by the Serbs. Action which he fails to fully explain, and which are not well grounded in history. And, while he faults the HDZ as “fundamentally treasonous” and hopes to see them replaced with “a new conservative party – one that will provide voters with a real patriotic-populist option,” he makes certain to describe Tomislav Nikolic and his Progressive Party (an offshoot of the Radical Party) as “odious,” and their popular support as troubling. More profoundly, he insists that Croatia cease its participation in the ICTY, but never indicates that other countries should do the same, implying that the Serbs should still bow before the court’s authority.
In truth, there is only one phrase in Kuhner’s article which the facts support. Namely, he is correct in describing the ICTY as “a kangaroo court.” Where he is once again in error is in insisting that it is subordinate to the whims of Serb nationalists, and has made a substantial effort to prosecute non-Serbs. The numbers tell a rather different story, as does the fact that Western forces that bombed the Serbs repeatedly (and allied themselves with the Croats, Bosniaks, and Kosovo Albanians) are not being held to account for violation of the same rules of warfare the Serbs are said to have ignored.
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Srebrenica: More Myth Than Massacre
Welcome Jihad Watch and De[construct] readers! If you enjoy this article, you may also like: Kosovo – Historical Distortions and Current Status & Bosnia’s Predictable Demise.
As the saying goes, history is written by the winners. And when it comes to the former Yugoslav peoples, that can readily be described as everybody but the Serbs. So it is unsurprising then that they have been vilified throughout the West, labeled as war criminals and butchers whose unmitigated xenophobia caused the collapse of a great multi-ethnic state and the bloodiest set of wars Europe had witnessed in a half century. Yet much as Joe Biden and other Serbophobic politicians who called for the repeated bombing of Serbia during the Wars of Yugoslav Secession might believe that summary to be accurate, the facts simply do not lend themselves to such a conclusion. This may be no better demonstrated than by looking at Srebrenica, which has long been Exhibit A in the court of world opinion in the case against the Serbs.
Officially, the story goes that around 8000 innocent Bosnian Muslims were, without any provocation, slaughtered indiscriminately by genocidal Serbs with revanchist aims, who were unmoved by the civilian status of their victims, or that the area they attacked was to be a safe haven managed by the unbiased and above reproach United Nations. As far as making a case for the bloody violence the Western allies would unleash on the Serbs, that did the job rather well, as it played to the sympathies of the emotionally-driven masses. Of course, with respect to capturing the truth, the governmental line is rather inadequate.
So what exactly is the truth? Alexander Dorin, a Swiss researcher who just recently sent his book “Srebrenica – The History of Salon Racism” to print in German (Serb and English translations are planned in the future) said in an interview that, “After 14 years of investigating events that took place in Srebrenica in 1995 I can attest there was no genocide over Muslims in that enclave — the myth about the massacre of Muslims was invented by the late Bosnian Muslim war leader Alija Izetbegović and then-U.S. president Bill Clinton.” Questionable as that allegation may sound to many, it is important to recall that the United States actively armed Izetbegović and his ragtag jihadist army during the war, applied pressure on Tudjman’s secessionist Croat government to cease his involvement in the Herzeg-Bosnia land theft, and sought actively to create a Bosniak state where one had not traditionally existed (for the land falls within the bounds of historic Serbia). Much of this, especially the sale of arms, was documented heavily even by the liberal American media at the time. And indeed, once the other factual inaccuracies become apparent, it seems quite evident that there was not a Srebrenica massacre, but rather a military engagement that, like many US operations, involved some inadvertant civilian casualties, that has been mythologized to give political cover to the warmongers that led us into battle on intelligence information more questionable than any ever utilized by the Bush administration.
For instance, the real number of dead bodies uncovered was closer to 2000. Some 3000 names of alleged victims were alive enough to vote in the 1996 elections. And many other dead bodies were found to be from previous gun battles or from non-violent ends more than a decade before the event in question. Still unaddressed though is guilt. Among the 2000 dead discovered were a very large number of soldiers who, under the leadership of jihadist Naser Orić killed some 3000 Serbian civilians beforehand. That raises perhaps the most important point: Srebrenica was not a purposeful slaughter of innocent civilians, but an effort by Serb forces to save the lives of their countrymen from an enemy army that had already spilled ample blood, and which was cowardly seeking refuge in protected civilian areas that were supposed to be unarmed, and therefore demilitarized. That there is no record of any military orders relating to civilians, or even mandating the execution of enemy soldiers is telling, in that it makes evident the aim was not to inflict unnecessary brutality, but to take control of the area such that the nearby Serb civilians they were charged with defending could go about their business unmolested instead of living with a paralyzing fear that the destruction of their village was imminent. Indeed, the size and weaponry of the Serb forces present would’ve proven insufficient for anything more grand. The physical evidence confirms as much, for of the dead Muslim soldiers discovered, a good number of them died not from execution, but from untreated wounds that came about during the two-sided military engagement.
All things considered then, we must realize that Srebrenica’s infamy is deserved not because it was home to an act of genocide in post-Holocaust Europe, but because the events that unfolded there amidst a highly misunderstood war have been so grossly distorted that the popular myth has overpowered reality, and in turn has given the Serbs a reputation for neanderthalic brutality and bigotry that is entirely undeserved. Even today, with the violence having long come to an end, the Serbs remain villainized and subject to undue scrutiny because of this and other associated lies. It is therefore important that the record be set straight and that the Serbs cease to be made a pariah simply because they were on the losing side of a war our country made much worse.
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Kosovo – Historical Distortions and Current Status
The following article was written for the Spring 2009 edition of OneWorld, a semesterly publication at Washington University dealing with issues of social justice and human rights around the globe.
On February 17, 2008, the Albanian-dominated autonomous province of Kosovo seceded from Serbia in violation of international law at the encouragement of the United States and many of its Western European allies. More than 50 nations, nearly two dozen of whom are EU members, have extended full recognition to Pristina. The bloodied and much coveted region (often called Serbia’s Jerusalem) is 88% Albanian, 7% Serbian, and 5% other (mostly Bosniaks, Turks, and Roma). Serbia, for its part, maintains that Kosovo is an integral component of its territory, in view of both history and international law. The Albanians, through a mixture of historical distortion and post-cleansing ethnic demography have suggested that Kosovo is not Serbian, and thus must be recognized as an independent nation (or, as some Albanian nationalist politicians suggest, a part of Greater Albania). Disputed legal status aside, one thing that is clear is that since NATO bombed Belgrade into submission and turned control of Kosovo over to the United Nations, what little authority Serbia had over the long autonomous province was lost. In the years since the transfer of power the status of the Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities living in Kosovo has declined dramatically, even when compared to the already abysmal treatment they were afforded under the Tito regime. Now regarded as independent by many Western nations, Pristina has a free hand to manage its own affairs, or as the case may be neglect them and thereby facilitate the further victimization of ethnic minorities. The situation is thus one which ought to be subject to far greater scrutiny by those concerned with human rights, for it could most charitably be described as tense and ideally suited for an upswing extreme violence. How is it that we have reached this point? And more importantly, how is it that justice and equality may be restored before more churches are bombed and innocent people are made victims?
The History
The exact origins of the Serbs are subject to substantial dispute, though the earliest recognized reference to them was made by geographer Vibius Sequestrus in the 6th century CE. And in his book De Administrando Imperio, the Byzantine Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus acknowledged the Serbs as having inhabited the Balkans (including among other areas, Raška: a part of modern day Kosovo) since the mid-seventh century CE, when Emperor Heraclius (reign: 610-640 CE) invited Serbs to settle in the area on the condition that they defend it from foreign aggressors. The only individuals recorded and recognized as having previously inhabited the region were the Illyrians, who were all but destroyed through barbarian attack, with survivors mixing indiscriminately among other ethnic groups in the region.
Some though, chiefly Albanian nationalists seeking to build a historical justification for their expansionist aims, have suggested that they are the direct descendants of the Illyrians. There is however, little support for their claim. Starting with the Croatians in the 16th century with scholars like Vinko Pribojević, there has been a conscious effort in the Balkans to link various ethnic groups positively with the Illyrians for political purposes. When Bogoslav Šulek definitively proved through linguistic analysis in 1844 that there was no direct link between the Illyrians and any Southern Slavic peoples, Albanian nationalists began to embrace Illyrian identity and construct highly questionable links in historical and linguistic terms to justify their claims. On its face, the Albanian claim falls flat, both because of archaeological gaps, and even more apparently through language. Of particular note is the extreme scarcity of Greek or Greek-rooted words in the Albanian language, which should have been abundant based on geography and trade had the Albanians been settled in the area constantly since the time of the Illyrians. Moreover, as Hemp pointed out, Albanian words such as Tomor (Latin Tomarus) are inconsistent with the phonological evolution of the language, suggesting that they were first modified through an intermediate language. The consequence of that would be to imply that the Albanians are not from Albania (much less Greater Albania), and do not have the historic roots many expansionists wish to present as fact.
In the early years of Serb settlement in the Balkans, their territory was, barring the occasional violent revolt, under the control of the Byzantine Empire. In 1183 however, a successful campaign by Grand Prince (of Raška) Stefan Nemanja marked the creation of a truly independent, Byzantine-free Serb state, comprised largely of territory that is presently known as Kosovo. His son continued the consolidation of territory, and by 1217 (two years before the establishment of a Serbian Orthodox Church) Pope Honorius had blessed the coronation of Stefan II (Stefan Prvovenčani) as King of Serbia. Following the papal endorsement, kingdoms across Europe recognized independent Serbia for the first time. Serious challenge to Serbian power in Kosovo was not long off, with the Battle of Kosovo taking place on June 28, 1389. It was one of the crucial early events that would lay the framework for a dramatic ethnic and religious shift in the now disputed region
The Battle of Kosovo saw the defeat of Serb forces at the hands of an Islamic army raised by Sultan Murad I of the Ottoman Empire, who had been waging many smaller attacks against Serbian lands in the preceding years with much success. Serbian territory in Kosovo was almost wholly seized, and remaining Serbian states fell in just over a century. Less than two decades before the last Serbian outposts fell to sword of Islam, then-Christian-Albania was also annexed by the Ottoman Empire. This is of particular consequence because, starting in the 17th century, Albanians began on large scale to convert to the religion of their conquerors – an option refused by the vast majority of the Serbs. Accordingly, under the sharia legal code of the Ottoman Empire, the Albanians found themselves with a newly elevated status, for they were now part of the ummah (the Islamic community), and were no longer kuffirs (infidels) subject to dhimmi (second class, a status accorded to certain non-Islamic peoples in dar-al-Islam (nations governed by Islam)) status. Having refused conversion, the Serbs staged a war for independence at the encouragement of an alliance of Christian powers. Like previous efforts, this campaign for liberation failed. With the prospect of Ottoman reprisal against the Serbs who had chosen war over conversion, many fled West to free Christian nations. The Serbians having left en mass, the Vilayet (province) of Kosovo (which includes the portion of Macedonia dominated by Albanians and considered a part of Greater Albania) was resettled by newly Islamic Albanians, permanently altering both the ethnic composition and the prevailing religious ideology of the area.
Albanian nationalism became a major force in the late 19th century, after the Russo-Turkish War, wherein the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano granted recognition to an independent Serbia, included in which was some territory occupied by Islamic Albania. In the subsequent decades as the Ottoman Empire began to collapse,war broke out in the Balkans to redraw the map, and tension between Serbs and Albanians reached new highs, with Kosovo being the focal point. After World War I, Kosovo was recognized as part of The Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (aka the First Yugoslavia), at which time the once ethnically-Serb territory of Kosovo was 75% Albanian, the overwhelming majority of whom were Muslim. They sought union with the independent state of Albania, trying diplomatic and later violent means to recreate the envisioned Greater Albania. After a failed appeal to the League of Nations in 1921, the Kachak movement arose to try and remove Serbians through guerrilla warfare. Success in their efforts would be achieved however only during World War II, when Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy awarded Kosovo to their Albanian ally following the takeover of Yugoslavia.
After the Allied victory in World War II, the Second Yugoslavia was formed, of which Kosovo was a part. Specifically, it was made an autonomous province within the Serbian republic. With the 1974 constitutional reforms, Kosovo became a de facto republic under the manipulation of Tito, the purpose being to ensure a weakened Serbia, which he viewed as necessary for the preservation of the federation, and more importantly his own political power. This was welcomed by Albanians both inside and out of Kosovo, because they saw it as a step towards the rebuilding of Greater Albania. Especially thanks to Serb emigration to other parts of Yugoslavia and an Albanian baby boom, it was evident that the demographics were shifting massively to the advantage of the already dominant Albanian population. With the death of Tito presenting what many considered an opportunity to divide the Federation, violence ensued and during the 1980′s more than 20,000 Serbs were forced to flee Kosovo for fear of their lives. This particularly brutal period was characterized by figures such as Fadil Hoxha calling for the rape of Serbian women, and instances of terrorism such as the burning of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in Pec, the center of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Under the rotating presidency system that included Kosovo, as well as the increasingly anti-Serbian republics of Croatia and Bosnia, the Serbian government failed to take a strong stand against these abuses, paralyzed by fear and the instability of the federation.
Slobodan Milosevic, sent to pacify the Serbs who were justifiably angry at the lack of action on the part of the Federal government to protect their life and liberty, broke with orders and actually allowed for a redress of grievances. This seemingly simple act brought about the start of a pro-Milosevic movement that eventually facilitated his rise to the forefront of Yugoslavian politics in any atypically democratic fashion. Unfortunately for him, this rise came at the very time Yugoslavia was disintegrating from a spike in ethnic nationalism and violence in the post-Tito era. During the 1990′s, the Wars of Yugoslav Secession began, wherein republics left Yugoslavia often through aggressive warfare. During this time of national disintegration, anti-Serb, anti-Jewish, and anti-Roma violence by the Albanian majority in Kosovo reached even greater heights, organized primarily through the Bin Laden associated, drug smuggling, organ trafficking terrorist organization known as the Kosovo Liberation Army. Despite labeling the KLA as a terrorist organization, the Clinton administration worked in partnership with them in 1999, when the NATO forces bombed Serbia and forced them to retreat from Kosovo, granting authority to newly established UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and the “freedom fighting” terrorists that had survived the war for independence.
The Present
With Serbians displaced from Kosovo in 1999, the cause for violence ought to have ended. Albanians comprised nearly 90% of Kosovo’s population and Serbs less than 10%, and ultimate authority was with an international body rather than Serbia or the Federal Yugoslav government. But the end of war brought no peace for the Serbs that remained in Kosovo who, to this day, are victims of undeserved brutality. Examples of this include the 2001 Podujevo bus bombing that killed 12 passengers headed to the graves of loved ones to pay their respects, and the 2003 gun attack in Goraždevac that killed or injured eight Serbs, all between the ages of 10 and 20. In 2004 alone, more than 200 Serbian homes and dozens of Orthodox Churchs were burned to the ground.
Today Kosovo has just three Jewish families, individuals who survived the nearly successful 1999 effort to kill or deport all Jews in the region. Needless to say, those remaining few to not enjoy much security, and make for easy targets in future violent attacks. Roma, who before KLA tyranny numbered 150,000, have shrunk to a meager 22,000. Those still living in Kosovo have virtually no freedom of movement and are under constant threat of violence. Many have taken refuge in the remaining Serb enclaves of Kosovo, and the rest have been herded into displaced persons camps similar to those seen after World War II. Meanwhile, the power vacuum that was created in Kosovo after the war has since been filled by the Wahabists who are pouring billions into the economically weak territory. Thus, even with the Al-Qaeda linked KLA ceasing to be the de facto source of Kosovor power, Islamism has a significant role in Kosovo’s affairs, and promises to increasingly radicalize this highly explosive piece of land if left untouched.
In view of the Islamist character of Kosovo, where the post-KLA political system is still dominated by the former leadership of the terrorist organization, the future of 100,000 Serbs who have opted to remain in spite of the violence against them, is exceptionally bleak. North Kosovo, where the largest number of Serbs remain, is physically connected to Serbia and thus carries on as though it were beholden to Belgrade instead of Pristina. They are considered the fortunate ones, able to find better paying jobs in the economically less volatile Serbia proper, and more importantly able to flee to safety should violence erupt yet again. More remote Serbian enclaves like Gračanica are surrounded exclusively by Albanian communities , and are continually hemorrhaging territory to the surrounding cities that are expanding to facilitate Albanian population growth. Such Serbs are particularly vulnerable to the abuses of an Albanian government with unchecked authority, as evidenced by a February 17 report in the Irish Times of a Serb man falsely convicted and jailed for a crime so that the government could seize his land.
For the non-radical, non-Islamist Albanian the situation leaves much to be desired as well. Kosovo’s economy, when compared to Serbia’s, is downright awful. Per capita GDP is less than €1000, and unemployment exceeds 40%. Especially with UNMIK downsizing and the removal of foreign forces that spent billions annually in Kosovo, the situation promises to deteriorate even further. Education too is lacking, having post-secondary school attendance rates that are the lowest in Europe. With nearly three-quarters of the world’s nations not recognizing Kosovo, it creates problems for those interested in venturing outside the country, as their documents may be rejected. And, as the jihadist element of the population grows, the more secular Albanian Muslims may find themselves subject to the same variety of violence often witnessed in Egypt and other unstable Muslim countries, or that which they have previously inflicted on the Serbs.
The Solution
There can be no doubt that the current system, wherein the legal status of Kosovo remains disputed and it attempts to operate independently sans-recognition by the great majority of nations, is unsustainable in the long term. Should this system remain the quality of life, the financial security of the state, the the prospects of long term regional peace would all approach disturbing levels. Any solution then must take into account how to improve the rights of all affected peoples, help ease the ethnic tension that so often results in war, enhance the general quality of life, and be just. Accordingly then, the only viable option is for the international community to withdraw recognition from Kosovo and reunite it with Serbia, this time removing the autonomy that was consistently expanded until the only remaining step was outright independence.
Serbia is often portrayed as equivalent to Nazi Germany in the Western media (despite the fact that they fought with the Allies, while the Albanians openly cooperated with the Axis), based on the exceptionally biased and misleading coverage in the mainstream media that accompanied the two unjustifiable and unlawful wars Clinton launched against it. However, history shows quite the opposite. Many of the alleged Serb war criminals awaiting trial in the Hague (or who died before a verdict was rendered, as was the case with Milosevic) were among the staunchest defenders of Yugoslav unity, and remained committed to the concept until it was abundantly clear that the dissolution of the federation was immanent and war was unavoidable. Indeed, reviewing the historical record, not one of the Wars of Yugoslav Secession was the product of Serbian instigation. Serbs, more than any other peoples, sought to keep the multi-ethnic dream alive. But, at the same time, they showed a great degree of moderation when left to deal with secession efforts on their own (for it must be recalled that those earliest cases were handled by the Yugoslav government, of which Serbia was a small part), as evidenced by the non-violent separation of Montenegro in 2006. Accordingly then, we can expect a Serbian government to better uphold the rights of minority populations and to apply a truly equal legal code (a concept first conceived of and implemented by Serb ruler Dušan in 1354).
Presently, the government in Serbia is left of center, and it is becoming increasingly Western in spite of the anger most Serbs feel over the loss of Kosovo. More than 60% of Serbians support joining the EU, and the government has already signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. It may join the EU as early as 2012. Kosovo, given its unclear status and the ability of any EU member to block ascension (including the many who don’t recognize it), would be ineligible on its own to ever join, and accordingly to enjoy the economic, educational, and travel benefits that come with membership. Even prior to EU membership, Kosovo would stand to gain dramatically, for Serbia boasts a much higher per capita GDP of nearly €8600, and is considered a much more attractive target for foreign investment. Additionally, by holding documents for a globally recognized state, the travel, commercial, and education restrictions that might otherwise apply would be waived. This is something that advantages all Kosovors, regardless of ethnicity or religion.
The transfer of authority over to Serbia would allow for the removal of the dangerous Islamist element that threatens the internal peace of Kosovo, while still allowing peaceful Muslims to practice their faith unmolested. Also, it would ensure that those remaining Orthodox Churches in Kosovo that haven’t been burned down by Albanian nationalists would be protected. By removing the pronounced religious tension and creating a better quality of life for all of those living in Kosovo, the impending threat of violence would be greatly reduced, and the prospect of war would fade. There would be genuine incentive for cooperation, ensured by the removal of the politician devices previously abused by Albanian nationalists that caused the war in the late 1990′s.
Finally, the solution I am proposing is consistent with international law in a way the present situation is not. UNSCR 1244, which authorized a UN presence in Kosovo, also re-affirmed the territorial integrity of Serbia, Kosovo included. It further stated that any future decisions regarding Serbia and Kosovo with respect to post-war land and governance would be addressed through negotiation and would rely on a UN framework. When the US pushed for Kosovo’s independence, it did not seek UN authorization because two of the Security Council permanent members (Russia and China) vowed to veto it. They reasoned that a unilateral declaration of independence would be destabilizing, and that independence could only be sanctioned if it were the product of bilateral agreement. As the existing legal framework was craftily avoided so as not to tar Kosovo with an image of illegitimacy, officially the status of Kosovo remains that it is a part of Serbia, with any details beyond that not firmly decided in the law. So, in keeping with the terms under which Serbia was forced out of Kosovo, the only just outcome is that it be recognized as a party of Serbia, which UNSCR 1244 stipulates it must be. That it should be absorbed fully rather than made autonomous is not a question covered in international law, but is one whose answer is made apparent in view of the problems that have historically arose from its autonomy.
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Bosnia’s Legitimacy (Or Lack Thereof)
Recently, I wrote an article about the ahistoric and doomed nation of Bosnia, which prompted quite a stir. Unsurprisingly, it compelled one reader to draft a guest editorial weakly attempting to refute my claims or second guess my underlying intentions. I could not let this go unchallenged, but I decided that getting lost in the comment section of another website probably wasn’t the best option in addressing the statements made by Edip Oncu. Thus, what follows are quotes from his article, and my response to them.
Where relevant, I have linked to sources that validate my claims. Feel free to read them if you so desire.
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At a time when the United States is celebrating its historical moment of having an African-American President-elect in its own challenge against its racial and religious prejudices, it is disappointing to see a biased article in an international affairs section regarding a European nation’s fate. In Caleb Posner’s column (Student Life, Nov. 5) he discusses Bosnia and Herzegovina’s nationhood or “historical validity” and proposes that the Bosnians should be denied of their independence and statehood. His claims are poorly-based and biased.
Since I write as an editorial columnist, it ought to be unsurprising that my writings do, in fact, reflect my personal opinion. Undoubtedly then, my column is biased, in the same way as something written by Julia Gorin or Jonah Golberg. But that does nothing to undermine the statements of fact contained within the article. And the claim made in Mr. Oncu’s opening paragraph proves invalid, as his subsequent objections are essentially groundless.
Posner attempts to negate the biggest achievement of the Clinton administration, to stop the Serbian genocide against the Bosnian people, and Richard Holbrooke, just because he thinks Bosnia is a breeding ground “for jihad and Islamism” requires serious consideration. (What is Islamism anyways? There is no political movement called Islamism in any kind of literature; did he mean radical Islamists? Or Islamic terrorists?)
Clearly, Mr. Oncu has an agenda. I say this because he speaks of the “Serbian genocide against the Bosnian” people as though it were indisputable fact, and was a one-sided slaughter where only the Serbs were guilty of inappropriate action. The truth is, while the Western media has sided overwhelmingly against Serbia, there is not a factual consensus on either of these issues. Even the most famous incident of the supposed slaughter of the Bosnians is heavily disputed. And even if we accept his claim that such a genocide occurred, no honest individual can claim that the Bosniaks were devoid of any guilt, since we know they had Jihadist militants fighting for them. They even had suicide units.
Now, to answer the parenthetical questions posed, Islamism is the ideological system of an Islamist. That is, one who seeks to modify existing law and culture to impose the values established in the Quran and Islamic law. While the potential for Islamism to become a powerful force has been there since the Turkish occupation of the Balkans centuries earlier, and has on occasion proven a problem, it manifested itself anew in a serious fashion during the war, when Al-Qaida got involved, and continues to this day (even the US recognizes this).
1. Posner writes, “Truth be told, Bosnia has no historical legitimacy.” How can any authority prove the historical legitimacy of a state? Who legitimizes a nation?
Well, a starting point we be a unified culture developed over time by a group of people who have consistently inhabited the region, and integrated the concept of nationhood into their identity. This does not, in any way, describe Bosnia. It plays host to three distinct groups. First and second are the Serbs and the Croats, both of whom have ethnic identities linked closely to neighboring states, and have a historic presence in the region. Third though are the Bosniaks. They are the Islamic individuals who identify themselves as Bosnian, chiefly because they have no other obvious group with whom to associate. It turns out though that Bosniaks are most closely linked with the Turkish (who, as noted in the above links, supplied many of the Jihadists that fought for the pseudo-nation). Indeed, the very term Bosniak is of Turkish origin. Of course, this influence only tells us so much. More important is the constantly changing status of Bosnia, which has historically been under the domain of others, usually linked to Serbia based on ethnic composition.
2.He next argues, “Bosnia is not a nation of historic validity, but a disputed buffer region.” Again, who validates if a nation is historically valid or not?
And is a nation a geographical term determined by buffer zone? Even if you use that ill-definition of buffer zone, Croatia was the buffer zone for centuries between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire. If Bosnia is artificial, so are Serbia and Croatia, since all those were created by Jozip Tito after WWII artificially.
Credit must be given to our Turkish friend Mr. Oncu for his attempts to use Serbian and Croatian legitimacy as a defense of Bosnia. Unfortunately, this does not hold up. As established previously, Serbia and Croatia both have legitimacy and historic precedent. This includes having distinct, coherent cultures of their own. The same cannot be said of Bosnia, which takes land that might otherwise belong to its neighbors, and establishes a new state for the purpose of militarily restraining two historic enemies. If Mr. Oncu wishes to draw a parallel, then the nation which Bosnia most closely resembles is the Western European state of Belgium. It too was created with the purpose of undermining the power of neighboring nations that were rising to challenge a foreign power (the UK), and is comprised of two distinct peoples who have little cause for unity.
3.Dayton Accords did not create that federal system as Posner argues; it was a system going far back to Ottoman times which was equally applied by Tito. The Bosnian lands becoming battlegrounds was the guilt of Serbian leaders, who ruthlessly and systematically applied means of genocide to claim majority in Bosnian lands. And all of those leaders went on trial for their part in genocide.
The federal system, AS IT PRESENTLY FUNCTIONS, was a product of the Dayton Accords. Nobody disputes that there were systems somewhat similar applied during previous times. But note that in none of those cases was Bosnia an independent nation free to act as it wishes. The creation of a federal Bosnian country is very much a late 20th century exercise in American political power that closely mirrors the British creation of Belgium.
As for the other claims, I have already taken issue with the general allegations of genocide on the part of the Serbs. So, rather than speak more to that invalid claim, I would instead note that the Bosnians have much to answer for, which our friend has conveniently forgotten about. Moreover, the bias of the ICTY, which is conducting the trials mentioned, is quite clear.
4. Posner claims that “Bosnia would be kept in check; its ability to provide a breeding ground for jihad and Islamism would be reduced by threat of invasion from neighbors.” This sentence explains Posner is against Bosnian independence just because there are Muslim people living in Bosnia. But, what kind of Islam do Bosnians practice, and are there any accounts that Bosnian people support any kind of terrorism? Any reasonable and informed person would know that Bosnian Muslims are generally tolerant and mild—it is one of the reasons they were butchered so easily by the Serbian soldiers.
It requires a special insanity to misconstrue my concerns about Islamism in Bosnia as meaning that I oppose Bosnian independence based exclusively on the population’s Islamic faith. My original article stated quite clearly that I do in fact support an Islamic state in the region following the return of parts of the country to Serbia and Croatia.
Again Mr. Oncu speaks of Islam in Bosnia, and the alleged criminal actions of the Serbs. I could once more note how the Jihadist problem in Bosnia is established fact or how it is they, not the Serbs, who owe us an explanation, even if the international community is unwilling to enforce justice.
My final question is this: Is Posner trying to justify Serbian genocide just because Bosnia has a sizeable Muslim population? What kind of an approach is it that leads to an American sophomore trying to deny a nation from its nationhood and proposing that that nation be swallowed up by its neighbors?
There is nothing to justify, though for the record, I would never endorse genocide based on a population’s religious identity. The issue here though is national validity, of which Bosnia has none. But I concede that present demographics require that an Islamic state remain in between Serbia and Croatia, even if it is the bastard child of the Ottoman empire.
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Bosnia’s Predictable Demise
This article, on its original publication website (Studlife.com) was featured on Serbianna’s “News Around the Web” section.
Note: Severe backup in Studlife’s Forum has bumped all regular Friday columns, this one included. Thus, the article below will not be published in print until next week. Do also note that because this was written for a newspaper, length limits constrained my ability to adequately expand upon this subject. I will do so in future writing, especially with regards to the topic of Bosnian jihad.
Last week, Clinton stooge and Dayton Accords author Richard Holbrooke wrote an alarmist editorial that has slowly be gaining international media attention, wherein he expressed great concern over the continued existence of Bosnia. He offered a number of diplomatic remedies that might, according to him, prevent what seems like the otherwise inevitable collapse of another state in the Balkans. The reason behind his article is because, as was noted therein, he regards the continued existence of modern Bosnia as essential. Rather than defend this position, this is an assertion he takes for granted, which ought not be the case. Truth be told, Bosnia has no historical legitimacy, is irrational in construct, and has been destined to fail from the start. While collapse of a state is rarely beneficial, especially in the powder keg of Europe, the way this situation is approached must be grounded in an appreciation for the region’s history and the present day realities, neither of which Holbrooke appears to firmly grasp.
Bosnia is not a nation of historic validity, but a disputed buffer region between the competing Serbian and Croatian nations, each of whom have legitimate claims to substantial portions of the land. Accordingly, it has been of a multi-ethnic character for centuries, and remains so today. However, this fuels substantial conflict in a region where multi-ethnic states have often proven themselves to be breeding grounds for violence and genocide, the overwhelming majority of which has always been directed against the Serbs. In a half-baked effort to pacify this battleground nation, the Dayton Accords created a federal system wherein there is a relatively weak national government, and two much stronger state governments. Republika Srpska hosts the nation’s sizable Serbian population, while the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina hosts the remaining Bosniak and Croat populations.
After many years of brutal warfare and chaos, both sides set national ambitions aside, and worked together to rebuild. But, as seemed fairly obvious to any individual with a grasp of the true nature of the Balkans, this was short lived. Though we have not yet seen war, the rhetoric has become increasingly polarized. Those in the Federation have been pushing for drastic reforms that would shift all of the power into a strong central government, where they would make up the majority of the population, and could thus run roughshod over the rights of the Serbian minority. In turn, this has inspired the highly moderate government of Republika Srpska to extend legitimacy to the idea of ending Bosnia, by way of becoming independent (or more reasonably merging with Serbia), should the need arise.
As the nation exists today, it is a tense union between two unlike factions with highly divergent agendas and interests. So why continue to prop it up? If the only justification is Balkans stability then the answer is not to add to the hasty patchwork keeping Bosnia as one nation, but to proactively develop and implement a more rational and permanent solution. That means separating Republika Srpska from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately, merging the former with Serbia. But what to do with the latter? Allowing it to become independent as is would be dangerous, since quite naturally the Croats would seek reunion with the motherland, and inspire yet another bloody conflict. As it happens, the ethnic divisions are presently such that the Croatian dominated portions could be given to Croatia without much issue, allowing the Bosniaks to have a new state of their own. Wedged between the powers of the region, it would be kept in check, and its ability to provide a breeding ground for jihad and Islamism would be reduced by threat of invasion from the concerned neighbor states (this will be elaborated on in a future column).
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